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Supreme Court, U.S.

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JOSEPH R. STANOL, JR.
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No. 8-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1989

THE CITY OF ROCKWALL, TEXAS,
Petitioner,

v.

GAYLA MCKEE,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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October 15, 1989

VOLUME ONE

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
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APPENDIX A



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Cite as 877 F.2d 409 (5th Ctr.1989)

expensive alternative. In this case, it appears the replacement option was the less onerous choice. The case is remanded for the district court to determine if Liberty has been completely compensated in common law damages for beaches of the Participation Agreement. The lower court must also decide the proper prejudgment interest rate under Texas Law for these common law damages, if any.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

**Gayla McKEE, Plaintiff-
Appellee,**

v .

**CITY OF ROCKWALL,
TEXAS,.et al., Defendants-
Appellants.**

No. 87-1879.

**United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.**

July 19,1989.

Woman brought action against city and certain individual police officers under § 1983 alleging that she had been injured as a result of officers' refusal to make an arrest after a domestic assault call and that nonarrest was result of city policy that discriminated on basis of gender. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Jerry Buchmeyer, J. denied defendants' motion for summary judgement and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, held that (1) court had no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal by city, and (2) plaintiff failed to establish that city had policy of discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases.

Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded.

Goldberg, Circuit Judge, concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion.

1. Federal Courts • 579

Although court had jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal from district court's decision denying

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motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity filed by individual police officer defending in a §1983 action court had no jurisdiction to hear municipality's appeal from same decision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

2. Civil Rights • 13.4(3)

When police officers can reasonably believe that they lack grounds to make an arrest, their refusal to do so cannot be unconstitutional

3. Civil Rights • 13.4(3)

Plaintiff failed to establish that police department had policy of discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases, as was required for plaintiff's action under § 1983 alleging that she was injured as a result of officers' refusal to arrest her boyfriend after being called to the couple's apartment on a report of domestic abuse. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

James Ludlum, Jr., Ludlum & Ludlum, Austin, Tex. for defendants-appellants.

Steven B. Thorpe, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, REAVLEY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Gayla McKee sued the City of Rockwall and certain individual police officers from the Rockwall Police Department. She alleged that she had been injured as a result of the officers' refusal to make an arrest, and that this non-arrest was the result of a Rockwall policy that discriminated on the basis of gender. She sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that her rights under the Equal Protection Clause had been violated.

The individual officers and the City sought summary judgment. The district court denied their



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motion. The officers and the City have asked for interlocutory review of that denial. Because we find that McKee has presented no evidence at all that the City pursues a discriminatory policy, we reverse the district court's judgment with respect to the individual officers. We have, however, no jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal by the City, and so remand for further proceedings on the claim against the City.

I

A. The Cause of Action

In April of 1986, Gayla McKee summoned police officers to the apartment she shared with Harry Streetman, claiming that Streetman had assaulted her. The police officers made no arrests, but did drive McKee to another location out of Streetman's view. After the officers had left, Streetman found McKee and slashed her leg with a knife. McKee contends that the officers acted pursuant to discriminatory policy against

making arrests in domestic assault cases. She further contends that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause, and seeks damages from the officers and the City.

In reviewing the district court's disposition of a summary judgment motion, we consider the issues de novo. All reasonable doubts and inferences must be resolved in the light most favorable to the non-movant. *Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville Railroad Co.*, 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir.1985). We therefor summarize the facts as set out by McKee in her complaint and in the affidavit accompanying her summary judgment brief.

McKee says that she was living with Harry Streetman, her boyfriend, during April of 1986. When she arrived home one evening, Streetman attacked and beat her. She found that Streetman had disabled her car to prevent her from escaping. She went to a convenience store, and phoned the police.



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Officers John Parrish and Gary Fleetwood were dispatched in response to the call. They eventually found McKee at the apartment. McKee says that while Parrish and Fleetwood were at the scene, they met Officer Trey Chaney, who was off-duty.

McKee told the officers that Streetman had assaulted her; that Streetman threatened to cause her severe injuries, and to kill her; that she was in fear of serious injury; and that Streetman would not permit her to retrieve her belongings, which were in the apartment.

McKee requested that the police arrest Streetman, or take her to her parents' home. She says that the officers refused to take either course. According to McKee, the officers said that she exaggerated the threats posed to her. They suggested she talk matters out with him.

McKee requested that the officers take her to the police station so that she could file a complaint against Streetman. She says that either

Parrish or Fleetwood told her that they could not take her to the station because she was inappropriately dressed. She adds that the officers said that although they would not take her to the station, she was free to go there on her own and to file a complaint. She further alleges that the officers told her that after she had calmed down she probably would not want to file a complaint.

According to McKee, Streetman at this point threatened to burn her belongings if she went to the station. McKee says that the police did not respond in any way when Streetman made the threat.

She says that, after refusing to arrest Streetman or to take her to the police station or her parents' home, the police drove her to the apartment of Bruce Streetman, which was about fifty yards distant from the apartment Harry Streetman and McKee had been sharing. McKee phoned her parents, but Harry Streetman arrived at Bruce's apartment a few minutes after McKee, and interrupted her phone



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call. McKee went to her car to wait for her parents. Harry Streetman followed her, and cut her right leg with a knife.

The officers' account is in some respects inconsistent with McKee's. The officers say, for example, that they offered to take McKee to the police station, but that she refused to go, and, indeed reused to give them the cooperation necessary to obtain a warrant for Streetman's arrest. Officer Parish says that Streetman never threatened McKee in his presence. As we have already noted, however, we must on this review resolve factual conflicts in favor of the non-movant, and so we accept, for purpose of this opinion, McKee's version of these contested facts.

The officer's affidavits do, however, allege other facts which are uncontested by any of McKee's evidence, and which may be true even if we accept as true everything stated in McKee's own affidavit. The officers report that they were not able to detect any evidence that

McKee had been assaulted. The Officers could not detect "any welt, bruise, abrasion, cut, skin discoloration, unneat appearance, or any other indication that she had been beaten or assaulted." Moreover, although the officers had been told when summoned that McKee was trapped inside an apartment, she arrived on the scene from a convenience store where she had called the police. the officer report that McKee looked angry rather than hurt, and that Streetman was calm. the officer say that they stood by while McKee removed her purse and some belongings from Streetman's apartment. They attest that Fleetwood remained with Streetman while Parrish drove McKee to an address where McKee said she wanted to be taken: that the address was out of the sight of Streetman and Fleetwood; and that the address to which McKee was being taken was never mentioned within the hearing of Streetman.

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McKee contends that the police officers would have arrested Harry Streetman but for a city policy which discouraged officers from making arrests in domestic violence cases. In an effort to present evidence of such a policy, McKee relied on an affidavit from her mother, and on statistics compiled from Rockwall's answers to McKee's interrogatories. Because these materials are crucial to the disposition of this case, we quote them in full, as presented to the district court. Darlene McKee's

affidavit consists essentially of the following paragraph:

Within one or two days of the assault upon my daughter, my husband Roy McKee and I had a conversation with Chief Beaty of the Rockwall Police Department. During that conversation we asked the Chief why Harry Streetman had not been arrested when our daughter first called the police and reported his assault upon her. The Chief responded that his officers did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial.

The statistics were presented as follows:

Analysis of Arrests in Assaults Cases and For Domestic violence 1982 and 1986

Source: Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, No. 8

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>Total</u>
Cleared Assaults	15	14	24	?	46	99
Resulting Arrests	6	5	5	6	14	36
Percentage of assaults leading to arrest						36%

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>Total</u>
Domestic violence	10	5	10	9	18	52
Resulting arrests	3	2	3	1	2	11
Percentage of domestic violence calls leading to arrests						21%

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These statistics contain a glaring mathematical error--the totals for the "cleared assault" table add six arrests from 1985 without making any corresponding addition to the number of calls, and so distort the overall percentages--but, for the most part, we postpone comment on these statistics until Section V below.

The officers and the department both deny that the department ever had, and that the officers ever acted pursuant to, a policy of refusing to intervene in domestic violence cases. Chief Beaty denied that there had been any persistent failure or refusal of officers to make arrests in domestic violence cases where there existed probable cause to make an arrest.

B. Procedural History

McKee sued the city of Rockwall and Officers Chaney and Fleetwood alleging liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint also named Eddie Keesee as a defendant, and made no claim

against Officer Parrish. The claim against Keesee was later dropped.¹ McKee sought to invoke the state's pendent jurisdiction over any state law tort claims, but has not alleged any particular such claim.

The City and the officers sought summary judgement, contending that the officers were insulated from immunity by the doctors of qualified immunity, that McKee's complaint failed to state a claim against the City; that McKee had failed to present evidence showing that any of the officers or the City had violated any state or federal law; that McKee had failed to present any evidence that the City maintained a

¹ McKee appended to her brief a document captioned, "Plaintiffs First Amended Original Complaint," which she purports to have filed with the district court. The amended complaint names Parrish as an additional defendant. The document in McKee's appendix is not file-stamped, and we express no opinion as to whether the document has been properly filed, or as to whether Officer Parrish has in fact been made a party to the underlying suit. Parrish has made no motion to become a party to this

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sexually discriminatory policy or custom which discouraged officers from making arrests for assaults arising in connection with domestic violence; that there was no casual link between the alleged policy and the non-arrest in this case; that McKee was the proximate cause of her own harm; and that because McKee's federal allegations were defective, the court had no jurisdiction to hear any pendent state claims.

II.

[1] We have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from a district court's decision denying a motion for summary judgement by an individual officer defendant in a §1983 suit. *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L.Ed. 2d 411 (1985).

No such doctrine exists, however, for the benefit of municipal defendants. Rockwall concedes as much, but asks that we extend the doctrine of *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, to encompass interlocutory

appeals by municipalities in instances when individual officer defendants take interlocutory appeals and when some of the defenses asserted by the individual officer defendants take interlocutory appeals and when some of the defenses asserted by the individual officers would, if accepted, protect the City from liability as well. Rockwall contends that permitting this limited range of interlocutory appeals would conserve judicial resources and protect cities from the expense of frivolous litigation.

We are not free, however, to shape the boundaries of our jurisdiction through a general equitable balancing of policy factors. The Forsyth Court itself applied the more general rule of *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay*, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L. L.Ed2d 351 (1978), and *Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.*, 337 U. S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). *Forsyth*, 105 S Ct. at 2816; see also *id.* at 2821 (concurring

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(concurring opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J.). Under the doctrine of *Coopers and Cohen*, an interlocutory appeal is permissible only with respect to a decision which conclusively determines a disputed question, and which involves a claim "of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action." *Forsyth*, 105 S.Ct. at 2816.

The Court reasoned that when an individual officer defendant sought summary judgement on grounds predicated in part upon the qualified immunity doctrine, the denial of that motion addressed a collateral issue by disposing of the officer's right to be free from suit. *Id.* Municipalities cannot make any comparable argument establishing that denial of their summary judgement motions settles a collateral issue.

Nor are we inclined to find here so strange an animal as "pendent party interlocutory appellate jurisdiction." This Court, through an opinion by Judge Goldbold, has

recognized that pendent interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over additional issues is looked upon with disfavor, and must not be invoked merely out of "convenience to the litigants, or even to this court." *Garner v. Wolfenbarger*, 433 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1970).

The same observation applies with at least equal force when we are asked to take pendent jurisdiction over parties otherwise not properly before us.

Precluding cities from taking an interlocutory appeal along with individual defendants may indeed result in some inefficient litigation. We expect, however, that the municipality will usually be able to reap in district court the benefits of a successful appeal by the city's individual co-defendants. In any event, we cannot expand our appellate jurisdiction without some signal from the Supreme Court that it is willing to relax the requirements of *Coopers and Cohen*.

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
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The attempted appeal by the City of Rockwall in this case must therefore be dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.

III

After the district court issued its opinion in this case, but prior to oral argument of the appeal, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in *DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS*, -- U.S.--, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed2d 249 (1989). In *DeShaney*, the Court held that "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." 109 S.Ct. at 1004. Footnote three of the Court's opinion qualifies this holding by observing that [t]he State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause. See *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)." *DeShaney*, 109 S.Ct. at 1004 n.3.

Because McKee's complaint sounds in Equal Protection, rather than Due Process, it is not directly barred by the holding in *DeShaney*. *DeShaney* is nonetheless relevant to our analysis of this case. The Court's opinion in *DeShaney* endorses the general principle that choices about the "extent of governmental obligation" to protect private parties from one another have been left "to the democratic political processes." 109 S.Ct. at 1003. There is no constitutional violation when the "most that can be said of ... state functionaries... is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active rule." 109 S.Ct. at 1007. Footnote three does not permit plaintiffs to circumvent the rule of *DeShaney* by converting every Due-Process claim into an Equal Protection claim via an allegation that state officers exercised their discretion to act in one incident but not in another.



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IV

We begin with some observations that are obvious, but not any less important for their obviousness. The officers had no authority to make any arrests absent probable cause to do so. The existence of probable cause turns no so much upon whether Streetman had committed a crime as upon whether or not the officers had sufficient evidence that Streetman had committed a crime. If Streetman had in fact, as McKee claims, assaulted McKee, but the officers had at the time found no credible evidence of the assault, the officers could not have made any arrest. The later discovery of evidence tending to prove that an assault had occurred would not alter the fact that probable cause was missing at the time the officers decided not to arrest Streetman. *DeShaney*, of course, goes well beyond these observations. The observations just summarized show only that, under certain conditions, the Rockwall officers *could not* have arrested

Streetman. *DeShaney* goes on to say that even if the officers *could have* arrested Streetman, they were not under any constitutional obligation to do so. The *DeShaney* rule leaves officers and law enforcement agencies with some discretionary authority: they need not fear that, in any case, they must choose between liability for a potential false arrest and liability for a potentially actionable non-arrest.

Nonetheless, even without *DeShaney's* protection for officer discretion, these fundamental limitations upon the officer's authority to arrest Streetman come close to deciding this case. McKee alleges that Streetman violated Tex.Pen.Code § 22.02 (Vernon), dealing with aggravated assault, or Tex.Pen code §22.02 (Vernon) dealing with aggravated assault. she contends that the officers should have arrested him pursuant to their authority under Tex.Code Crim.Proc. §14.03(a) (Vernon), which permits officers to make a

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warrantless arrest based upon a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has committed a felony.

[2] It is arguable that, even accepting McKee's version of the facts, the officers in this case might reasonably have concluded that they lacked probable cause to believe that Streetman had committed an assault. the existence of probable cause to arrest turns upon the totality of the circumstances. The only evidence of the alleged assault was McKee's allegation. Yet the officers could see no physical indicia of an assault. the situation at the scene was moreover, inconsistent with the details of the call relayed to the officers. McKee was not trapped within Streetman's apartment, but was outside the apartment, returning from the convenience store from which she phoned the police. McKee was hostile while Streetman was calm. It is not clear that the police would, under these circumstances, have developed the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an arrest. If indeed the

indeed the police could reasonably have believed that they lacked grounds to make an arrest, their refusal to do so cannot be unconstitutional. See *City of Los Angles v. Heller*, 475 U.S.796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed2d 806 (1986) (if plaintiff has suffered no deprivation of constitutional rights, it is irrelevant that city's policy would have authorized such a deprivation).

We might be able to decide the case on this ground were it not for McKee's allegation that Streetman threatened her in the presence of the officers. McKee's allegation creates a fact issue as to whether the threat occurred, and as to whether the police officers heard the threat. Although a threat to McKee's property may not be evidence of a prior assault, it could itself be a crime. Texas law prohibits, under the name of "retaliation," threats against the property of a police informant. "Informant" is defined broadly, so as to encompass anyone who provides information to the



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government. Tex.Pen.Code § 36.06 (Vernon). If the officers heard the threat, they would have witnessed a felony, and would have had authority to arrest Streetman pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc. §14.01.

V

McKee cannot, however, prevail merely by showing that the officers knew facts that would have justified an arrest of Streetman. This is the lesson of *DeShaney*: That law enforcement officers have authority to act does not imply that they have any constitutional duty to act. McKee purports to find such discrimination in an alleged policy of the Rockwall Police Department discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases. McKee contends that this policy discriminates against women.

McKee must present some evidence of such a policy in order in order to survive the defendants' summary judgment motion. When showing on an essential element of

her case, the moving party is entitled to summary judgement "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed2d 265 (1986).

[3] We have already quoted in full the only evidence which McKee produced to support her allegation of a discriminatory policy. This evidence, however, is completely without probative weight. Half of the evidence consists of one statement, allegedly made by the Rockwall Police Chief indicating that officers "do not like to make arrests" in domestic violence cases. A dislike is not a policy. Officers may do things--indeed, they may be required by policy to do things--that they do not like to do. Nor, for that matter, is one officer's disliked making arrests in domestic violence cases, but that Officers Fleetwood and Parrish did not share this



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dislike. In this respect, too, a dislike is different from a policy, which is binding on all officers regardless of their sentiments.

The remainder of the evidence consists of the rough statistical comparison between the "domestic violence" and "cleared assault" rates. We have already observed that McKee exaggerated the discrepancy between these two rates by figuring the numbers for 1985 into the numerator, but not the denominator, of the cleared assault fraction. There are additional problems. First, McKee's own evidence shows that the domestic violence arrest rate was higher than the cleared assault arrest rate in two of the four years for which McKee presented complete statistics. The domestic violence arrest rate was higher in 1983 and 1984 (40% and 30% compared to 36% and 21%, respectively), while the cleared assault arrest rate was higher in 1982 and 1986. As such the statistics do not, even on their face permit one to infer a disinclination

to make arrests in domestic violence cases, much less to infer a policy discouraging such arrests. Second, the statistics do not correct for the wide variety of factors which might influence the likelihood that police would make an arrest whether the assault was in progress when police arrived; whether a gun or knife had been used; whether the victim had suffered obvious physical injuries and required medical attention; and whether the victim refused to press charges when the police arrived. Third, the statistics do nothing to suggest gender-based discrimination. the statistics do not indicate how many of the victims in the cleared assault cases were women, or how many of the victims in the domestic violence cases were men.

There is still another reason why McKee's statistics, and the alleged statement of Chief Beaty, lack any probative value. McKee, according to her own affidavit, asked the officers to arrest Streetman or to take her to her parents' home. Even if one were willing to draw from



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Chief Beaty's alleged statement the unreasonable inference that Rockwall had a policy discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases, there is no reason that such a policy would have deterred the officers from taking McKee to her parents' home. Certainly a dislike for making arrests would not have prevented them from providing such transportation. The same is true if one is willing to draw from McKee's statistics the unreasonable inference that Rockwall had a policy discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases. Indeed, on McKee's argument, had the Rockwall officers done precisely what McKee asked by driving her to her parents' residence, their action would have entered McKee's statistics as a domestic violence "non-arrest" and so supported an inference that the police department discriminates against women. we find that reasoning absurd.

McKee cannot meet her burden under *Celotex* by using the statistics, or the statement attributed by her

mother to Chief Beaty. with these bases for her case eliminated, her argument reduces to an attempt to generalize a single incident--the police department's inaction in her own case--into a general policy or practice. We have indicated in other contexts that a single incident, when unaccompanied by supporting history, will frequently be an inadequate basis for inferring a policy. See e.g., *Rodriguez v. Avita*, 871 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying *City of Canton v. Harris*, --- U.S.---, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205 & n. 10, 103 L.Ed2d 412(1989) to claim predicated on a single incident). To permit such an argument in this case would eviscerate the discretion reserved to police officers by *DeShaney*. Absent any evidence of a discriminatory policy, the only reasonable construction of the officers' action in this case is that they decided that McKee's complaint did not warrant any further response than what they



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gave. As *DeShaney* makes clear, this judgement is not actionable.

The § 1983 claims against the individual officers must be dismissed because McKee has failed to provide any evidence tending to show that the officers' inaction was a consequence of discrimination against a protected minority. with these claims eliminated, the jurisdictional basis for the pendent state law claims disappears, and they too must be dismissed.

VI

Because we find that there is a "complete failure" of proof with respect to McKee's allegation of differential treatment of the victims of domestic violence, we do not decide whether other elements of an equal protection claim were present. In particular, we do not decide whether, had McKee created a fact issue as to the existence of a policy discriminating against victims of domestic violence, that policy would constitute intentional discrimination against women under

the rule of *Washington v Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed2d 597 (1976), or whether that policy would discriminate against a protected minority within the meaning of *DeShaney's* footnote three.

VII

For the reasons stated, the district court's denial of the individual officers' summary judgement against those officers are dismissed. The appeal of the City is dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.

REVERSED in part, DISMISSED in part, and REMANDED.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Many police officers appear to treat domestic violence involving a female victims less seriously than they treat assault between strangers.¹ Such a difference in

¹ See Comment, *Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?* 95 Yale



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treatment, if proven in a particular case, denies a woman the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

This case is before us on summary judgement. The majority holds that McKee, the nonmovant, has offered "no evidence at all" to support her equal protection claim, thus permitting a qualified immunity inquiry. See *City of Los Angeles v. Heller*, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed2d 806 (1986). On this point, I respectfully but fervently disagree, although I believe that the officers, as sued in their individual capacities, are entitled to qualified immunity. *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In addition, the majority offers extensive nonessential discussion with which I disagree, concerning (1) the

application of *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services*, ---U.S.---, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed2d 249 (1989), to equal protection claims; and (2) the officers' authority to arrest Streetman under Texas law. I discuss these issues in the course of my equal protection and qualified immunity discussion below. See Part I.

I dissent in Part II from the majority's dismissal of McKee's pendent state law claims. We should remand the issue of retaining jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims to the sound discretion of the district court. Finally, in Part III, I agree that the City of Rockwall may not invoke the collateral final order doctrine under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, noting that the majority's use of the phrase "interlocutory order" in this context, should not be confused with interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.

I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION

I.J. 788 (1986). For the numerous statistical studies which bear out this observation see *Battered Women*, 95 Yale I.J. at 788-89 n.3.



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The majority correctly holds that the plaintiff's section 1983 claim should be dismissed against the officers, in their individual capacities. The plaintiff's right to equal protection, in light of her summary judgement evidence, was not clearly established at the time of the incident in such a way that "a reasonable [police officer] would understand that what he [was] doing would violate that right." *Melear v. Spears*, 862 F.2d 1177, 1183 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed2d 523 (1987)). I do not, however, agree with the majority's approach to the dismissal of plaintiff's section 1983 claim against the officers.

Instead of holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the majority holds that McKee has presented "no evidence at all" to support her underlying equal protection claim, thereby never reaching the immunity issue.² The

majority, I believe, has erroneously read the summary judgement evidence against the non-movant, McKee.

Two summary judgement hurdles stand in McKee's way in this case. First, McKee must show that an issue of fact exists concerning the officers' authority under Texas law to arrest Streetman, McKee's boyfriend, as a predicate to McKee's claim that the police violated her right to equal protection by refusing to arrest Streetman. The majority discusses the issue at length, inconclusively stating it is "not clear" that the police would under these circumstances have developed the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an arrest. As I shall demonstrate, McKee has presently sufficient summary judgment evidence to raise a jury question on this issue.

The second summary judgement barrier to McKee's claim concerns

no claim, virtually preordains judgement for the City of Rockwall on remand.

² Of course, the majority's reasoning, that McKee has made out



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the elements of an equal protection violation. McKee maintains that the officers discriminated against her because she is a female. The majority holds that "no evidence" supports her claim of gender discrimination. I believe that McKee has offered summary judgement evidence sufficient to shoulder this burden, and I believe that the same evidence would allow a jury to infer the discriminatory intent necessary to find an equal protection violation. The majority does not reach this last issue. McKee's evidence is not extensive, but it allows the reasonable inference that the police treated her based upon illegitimate stereotypes and archaic notions of women.

A. *DeShaney and Equal Protection*

I address an issue at the threshold that is not central to the majority's decision, but is sure to stand important in the future. The majority discussess at length the Supreme Court's recent decision of

DeShaney v. Winnebago County, --- U.S.---, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), stating that *DeShaney*, which concerns the substantive componet of the Due Process Clause, "nenetheless relevent to our analysis of this case," which concerns an equal protection claim. The majority apparently views *DeShaney* as a general statement that governmental officers, in their actions, enjoy a zone of discreation regarless of the Fourteenth Amendment right involved.

DeShaney should play no role in McKee's case. *DeShaney* seeks to define a bright line limit to the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., *Bowers v. Hardwick*, 478 U.S. 186, 106, S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (holding that substantive component of Due Process Clause does not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy). *DeShaney* specifically does not address claims based upon illegitimate distribution of public services in contravention



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of the Equal Protection Clause. "The State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause. See *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). But no such argument has been made here." *DeShaney*, 109 S.Ct. at 1004 n. 3.

The Supreme Court states that the Due Process Clause was "intended to prevent [the] government 'from abusing [its] power, and employing it as an instrument of oppression...'" *DeShaney*, 109 S.Ct. at 1003. In "substantive due process analysis, it is the state's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf--through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty--which is, the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other

means." *DeShaney*, 109 S.Ct. at 1006.

Equal protection values are not tied to the scope or limits of governmental discretion, but are tied, instead, to the government's obligation not to make illegitimate distinctions among those to whom the government provides services. "Although there is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not discriminate in providing such protection." *Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas*, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988); cf. Sunstein, *Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection*, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev.1161, 1179 (1988) ("Equal Protection Clause...is grounded in a norm of equality that operates largely as a critique of traditional practices").

Imagine that in *DeShaney*, Winnebago County had an intentional policy to intervene only in family abuse causes when the



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family is white, not to intervene when the family is black, that Joshua DeShaney was black and died because the County's failure to intervene. The majority would have us believe that no equal protection violation exists because "[f]ootnote three [of *DeShaney*] does not permit plaintiffs to circumvent the rule of *DeShaney* by converting every due Process claim into an Equal Protection claim via an allegation that state officers exercised discretion to act in one incident but not in another."

The "democratic political processes" upon which the majority rests its hope that all people receive equal protection of the law is not adequate for the task of protecting people when distinctions are made upon suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. See *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Bixby, *The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v.*

Classic, 90 Yale L.J. 741, 746-60 (1981) (tyranny of the majority). We hold dear equal protection values, in large part, because the legislative process may fall short of the Constitution's commands. There can be no "discretion" to discriminate invidiously.

B. Officers' Authority to Arrest Under Texas Law

McKee presented sufficient evidence to raise a jury question concerning whether the officers possessed authority to arrest Streetman without a warrant under Texas Law. McKee's Evidence is sufficient because the Texas legislature in 1985 broadened the authority of police officers to arrest without a warrant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 14.03(2) (Vernon) (Sept. 1985). McKee's assault occurred in 1986. To appreciate the legislative revision one must understand the applicable rules of law before 1985. Traditionally, in Texas, an officer with probable cause could only arrest a suspect



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without a warrant in two situations:

(1) *if the officer personally observed* the arrestee commit either a felony or a misdemeanor, or (2) if the officer had reason to believe that the arrestee committed a felony. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 14.01 & 14.03 (Vernon) (1967).

Texas subdivides assault into simple assault (22.01) and aggravated assault (22.02).³ In Texas, the crime of simple assault is only a misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01 (Vernon). "A person commits [the offense of simple assault] if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes *bodily injury* to another... or (2) ...threatens another with *imminent bodily injury*...." Tex. Penal Code § 22.01. In contrast, the crime of aggravated assault is a felony. "A person commits [the offense of aggravated assault] if the person commits assault as defined in Section 22.01 if this code [simple assault] and the

person: (1) causes Serious bodily injury to another...." Tex Penal Code § 22.02 (Vernon). The alleged crime of simple assault, a misdemeanor is involved in this case.

As used in the assault statutes and the arrest statutes, the terms "bodily injury" and "serious boldily injury" are defined by statute. "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment if physical condition." Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(7) (Vernon) (emphasis added). Serious bodily injury is defined as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death if that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex Penal Code § 1.07(34) (Vernon).

Under the Texas assault statutes, and the pre-1985 arrest statutes, the officers would need to find evidence of "serious bodily injury" - an element of an aggravated assault, which is a felony--before they could arrest a person for an

³ A third category of sexual assault is not material here.



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committed outside of their presence. For the officers to make a misdemeanor arrest for simple assault, an element of which is "bodily injury," either they would have to witness the incident or they would have to procure a warrant. To procure a warrant, it is necessary for the complaining party to file a complaint.

Effective September 1, 1985, the Texas legislature dramatically revised the applicable law. No longer is "serious bodily injury" necessary for an officer to be able to arrest a suspect without a warrant if they act of violence was committed outside of the officer's presence. A police officer "may arrest, without warrant: ...(2) persons who[m] the [police] officer has probable cause to believe have committed an assault resulting in *bodily injury* to another person and the [police] officer has probable cause to believe that there is danger of further bodily injury to that person...." Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Art. 14.03(2) (Vernon) (1985)

(emphasis added). Only "bodily injury," the standard embodied in the simple assault statute, is now necessary for an officer, as of 1985 to be able to make an arrest in a case in which the officer did not observe the assault.

The majority states that "[t]he only evidence of the alleged assault was McKee's allegation. Yet the officers could see no physical indicia of an assault." Physical marks on a victim's body are not necessary to constitute *bodily injury* under Texas law. Texas requires that the victim experience "physical pain, illness or any impairment of any physical condition" for the victim to suffer "bodily injury" under the statute, Tex.Penal Code § 1.07(7), but this standard does not necessarily require welts, cuts, bruises or any other physical indicia of injury. someone who is punched in the stomach may experience physical pain, but there may not be any "marks" or other physical pain but there may not be any "marks"



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or other physical indicia of the blow.


Texas courts have addressed clearly the physical pain/bodily injury issue. *Yarbrough v. Texas*, 656, S.W.2d 32, 32-33 (Tex.App.--San Austin 1983) (a kick to a man's groin found to be sufficient physical pain to sustain the requirement of bodily injury); *Rangel v. Texas* 747 S.W.2d 32, 32-33 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988) (slap to the face met bodily injury standard); *Madrigal Rodriguez v. Texas* 749 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988) (placing a knife tip at a person's neck, without any evidence of the knife puncturing the victim's skin, gave rise to sufficient physical pain). The important factor is whether the victim experiences physical pain, not whether there is any physical indicia of a serious bodily injury.

McKee's summary judgment evidence gives rise to a jury question concerning whether a reasonable police officer would

discern that McKee was experiencing physical pain, and therefor, whether the officers had the authority to arrest Streetman under Texas law for simple assault, a misdemeanor. We accept the plaintiff's evidence, including the affidavit, as true at this state in the case. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.* 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); *Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp.* 812 F.2d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 1987). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See Phillips, 812 F.2d at 272. We are not to judge the credibility of the witnesses at this stage; such judgements must be made by the trier of fact at the appropriate time.

In her affidavit responding to defendant's motions for summary judgement, McKee states:

"On and prior to April 30, 1986, I was living at the residence of Harry



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Streetman in Rockwall, Texas. On that date, I arrived home and was attached and beaten by Mr. Streetman. I also discovered that Mr. Streetman had disabled my car and thereby prevented my escape. He also threatened me with severe personal injury." McKee goes on in her affidavit to state:

"I informed the officers of the following facts:

- A. that I had been physically assaulted by Harry Streetman.
- B. That Harry Streetman had made threats of severe bodily injury and death against me.
- C. That I was in fear of serious injury if Mr. Streetman was not restrained.
- D. That my personal effects are in Mr. Streetman's apartment and that he would not allow me to retrieve them.

Additionally, I requested that the police arrest Mr. Streetman or take me to my parents' home, a place of relative safety".

A reasonable inference from McKee's affidavit is that she

experienced physical pain from Streetman beating and assaulting her. McKee told the officers that she had been assaulted and that she feared imminent bodily injury from Streetman. Tragically, her fear came true. However, the officers did not believe McKee so they left the scene. Shortly after their departure, Streetman knifed McKee.

At this summary judgment stage, it is inappropriate for a court to test the credibility of the affiant. the majority errs by engaging in discussion which properly should occur within the enclosure of the jury room. We have a classic conflict about exactly what evidence was before the officers when they refused to arrest Streetman. I disagree with the majority's reasoning and characterization of the evidence concerning the authority of the officers to arrest Streetman. Two very different versions-- McKee's and the officers' --tell the story of what McKee told the officers on April 30, 1986. For summary judgement purposes, we



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must believe McKee. Consequently, we should find that McKee has presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers had the authority to arrest Streetman for his beating of McKee before the officers arrived.

C. McKee's Equal Protection Claim

McKee maintains that a *de facto* policy or custom of the police officers of Rockwall, which treats victims of domestic assault less seriously than victims of non domestic assault, purposefully discriminates against women. McKee also maintains that the actions of the officers involved in this case reflect the City of Rockwall's policy or custom and demonstrate an acceptance of the *de facto* policy by the individual officers.

The majority's holding exists in its statements that McKee has offered "no evidence at all" and has completely failed to adduce facts supporting her claim of gender-

based discrimination. I respectfully disagree. McKee, the nonmovant, has produced summary judgement evidence short on extensiveness but long on meaning to support her claim that the city's *de facto* policy or custom, and the officer's individual actions, are not gender-neutral. Her evidence also allows an inference of purposeful or intentional discrimination, *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.* 477 U.S. 242, 106, S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91, L.Ed 2d 202 (1985); *Personnel Administrator v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93, 60 L.Ed2d 870 (1979); *Washington v. Davis*, 426, U.S.229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed2d 597 (1976). The majority does not reach the intent issue, but it is clear that the Supreme Court does not require a non-movant to produce a smoking gun to advance past the summary judgement stage.

1. General Framework of Equal Protection Law Applicable to this Case



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A broad understanding of equal protection doctrine aids one's inquiry in this complex area. The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not remove from the states and cities the ability to classify people, and accordingly treat the various categories differently. "Certain classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm.

•••Classifications based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination. [citation omitted]. *Personnel Administrator of Mass v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93, 60 L.Ed 2d 870 (1979).

"[The Supreme Court] recent cases teach that such classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, [citation omitted], and are in many settings unconstitutional." *Personnel v. Feeney*, 99 S.Ct. at 2293.

To decide whether evidence gives rise to an inference of gender discrimination, one must first determine whether the official action is gender neutral or purposefully gender-based. Since the Supreme Court decided *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S.229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed 2d 597 (1976), and *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed 2d 450 (1977), a plaintiff, to utilize any sort of heightened scrutiny and thus realistically hope to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, must demonstrate that the action taken was taken in part with discriminatory purposes...••• when there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision [] judicial deference is no longer justified." *Arlington Heights*, 97 S.Ct. at 563.

In many cases, a plaintiff challenges a statute and asserts that the statute is not gender neutral. See *Feeney*, 99 S.Ct. at 2293.



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Sometimes a plaintiff is not challenging the enacted, positive law, but, instead, is challenging the administration of a neutral statute. Discriminatory treatment is also subject to equal protection analysis. See *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).

Because the exact words of a statute cannot be examined in a discriminatory treatment case, one must analyze the policies, customs, attitudes, understandings and practices of the entity or persons making the alleged distinctions. Is the treatment gender neutral from the viewpoint of the persons or entity making the distinction? If so, an

examining court must engage in a secondary line of inquiry and examine any alleged discriminatory impact to determine whether the "adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination." *Feeney*, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. In contrast, if the entity or persons making the alleged distinction understand that men and women are purposefully treated differently through their actions-which in a discriminatory application case constitutes the "classification scheme"-then a court can conclude that the differing treatment is, in fact, gender-based. It is not necessary to receive a signed admis-

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sion from one of the state actors that the differing treatment is invidious. Covert purposes and understandings are just as constitutionally relevant as overt purposes, see Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293, and are much more likely to be the modus operandi of those persons who purposefully discriminate by their actions against others based upon invidious reasons.

Those who discriminate on the basis of race and gender do not usually parade down main street with their banners of bigotry unfurled. As our society continues to change, purposefully discriminatory actions occur more frequently behind closed doors and

within the recesses of the mind than in the open square of public discourse. But whether on the corner square or within the dark passageways of the mind, purposeful discrimination is still invidious.

It is not necessary that the person or entity making an alleged illegitimate distinction be Attila the Hun.

Malice and evil will are not the constitutional standards. "[P]urposeful discrimination is the 'condition that offends the Constitution.' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554." Personnel v. Feeney, 99

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S.Ct. at 2293. A person who acts according to stereotypical notions, can act purposefully if the person consciously intends to accomplish the action undertaken. From generation to generation we pass down ideas and beliefs about how the world works. Some of these traditions are, in fact, generalizations which are only stereotypes of how women and men are different. A person who consciously believes in the truth of the stereotype acts purposefully when the person implements the stereotype in a particular situation. This sort of purposeful action is what the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause is

all about. See generally *Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) ("care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypical notions"). Continuity of a stereotype through the generations combined with a person's action pursuant to the alleged "truth", may be purposeful action on the person's part within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.

Imagine that the Greene family gets together every Sunday evening for supper. Mama Greene every week cooks a big meal. Most of the

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children and grandchildren attend. This is a family tradition: Sunday supper at Mama's table. When Anita Greene, the second daughter, thinks about what she is going to do next Sunday, she has to decide if she is going to eat supper at her parents' house. Maybe one week Anita decides she has too much work to do at the office, so she telephones her mother and tells her she cannot come on Sunday. The next week arrives, and Anita decides to go and have Sunday supper with the family. When she goes over to her parents' house and eats with the family, her actions are purposeful. She is a creature of free will.

Anita purposefully goes and eats Sunday supper with her family, although her motivation in part results from habit. Sunday supper at the Greene house is a tradition.

Traditions may reflect purposes so ingrained that particularized decision-making instance by instance becomes unnecessary. Customs, Traditions, and stereotypes often guide and motivate us in choosing what path we shall follow. Such choices can nevertheless be purposeful. Such purposefulness, when it is rooted in illegitimate notions of race or gender, is the sort of action that is not neutral under the Equal Protection Clause.



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If an action is gender-based, then it is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). The Supreme Court's decisions establish "that the party seeking to ... classif[y] individuals on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification. [citations omitted]. The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important gov-

ernmental objectives and the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' " Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. (quoting Lee-s, Family Offense Cases in the Family Court System: "in 29 out of every 30 such cases the husband stands accused of abusing his wife"); see Comment, Battered Women, 95 Yale L.J. 788 (cited in note 1, supra). Our equal protection jurisprudence requires evidence of a classification; judicial notice will not do.

McKee has offered such evidence. When the Chief states-that women, not men, are the victims in "dome-

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stic" assault cases-
the plaintiff hurdles
a barrier which is
extremely difficult to
ascend. This supplies
the understanding that
domestic assault af-
fects women. A gene-
ral observation of our
society confirms what
the Chief easily reco-
gnizes, that is that
women are the victims
in domestic violence
situations.⁴ A Texas
statute is a good ex-
ample of the observa-
tion that women par-
ticularly suffer from
violence in the home.
the assault statute,
Tex.Penal Code § 22.01
was amended in 1979 to
i n c l u d e t h e
underscored words: "A
person commits an
offense if he: (1)

i n t e n t i o n a l l y ,
knowingly, or reck-
lessly causes bodily
injury to another,
including his spouse
...." The Texas legi-
slature felt it was
necessary to make it
explicit that husbands
cannot beat their wiv-
es. Presumably, befo-
re the Texas legisla-
ture made this clear,
some people though,
and probably still
think, that it is ac-
ceptable for husbands
and boyfriends to beat
their wives and girlf-
riends.⁵ See Thurman

⁵ In 1985, beyond
the ordinary assault
statutes, the Texas
legislature, implicit-
ly recognizing the
attitude reflected in
the Chief's statement,
felt compelled to
highlight the duties
of police officers in
domestic violence sit-
uations in Art. 5.04

⁴ See note 1, supra.



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v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting from scholarly writings which set forth that at common law, husbands were permitted to beat their wives, within limits).

Women in their homes are vulnerable to the men with whom they live. Women's vulnerability is heightened by a police officer's hesitancy and sometimes refusal to invade the space of privacy which surrounds the family or unit of people living together. The Texas legislature has attempted to address and refute the historical

belief that the curtilage of a man's home is sacrosanct. "A man's home is his castle" indeed. The officers' dislike affects women.

The Chief voices the sentiments and purposes of the officers he commands by stating that "his officers did not like to make arrests....". The buried feeling among his officers, according to the Chief's statement, which we must take as true, is that women are responsible for the officers' disinclination to make arrests in domestic assault situations. This blaming of the victim operates to deprive women of the protection of the police from assault bas-

(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Code Crim Proc. Art. 5.01(a) (Vernon).

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ed upon their status as women. The majority states that "a dislike is not a policy," and "one officer's dislike [is not] binding on another." The majority's construction of the evidence against nonmovant is inappropriate. A trial may demonstrate that a "dislike" and a de facto policy are one and the same. The Chief is certainly competent to discuss whether a particular action or response in a given situation is a custom or de facto policy of the officers he commands. The Chief's statement creates an issue of fact concerning the discriminatory treatment of women in domestic assault situations.

This evidence should be enough for plaintiff to survive summary judgment concerning the viability of her equal protection claim.

b. McKee's Affidavit

The officer's interaction with McKee constitutes evidence that, when coupled with the Chief's statement, would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of McKee's equal protection claim. Again, because this case is presented in the posture of defendants' motions for summary judgment, we must treat plaintiff's evidence as true.

In her affidavit, quoted above, McKee informed the officers that Streetman had beat her, and that she

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feared that he would do so again because he had threatened her. McKee states: 'The officers present refused to drive me to my parents' home and refused to arrest Mr. Streetman. Instead, they said that I was exaggerating the threat Mr. Streetman posed to me and suggested that I talk matters out with him. *** They also indicated that after I had calmed down I probably would not want to file a complaint. At this time, Mr. Streetman threatened to burn my belongings if I went to eh station [to file a complaint]. The police did not respond." (emphasis added).

The treatment McKee received calls to mind

the archaic and stereotypical usage of the word "hysteria." The Oxford English Dictionary, finally published in 1933 after 70 years of compilation, defines "hysteria" as follows: "1. Path[ological] A functional disturbance of the nervous system, characterized by such disorders as anaesthesia, hyperaesthesia, convulsions, etc., and usually attended with emotional disturbances and enfeeblement or perversion of the moral and intellectual faculties." The OED goes on to state: "Women being much more liable than men to this disorder, it was originally thought to be due to a disturbance of the uterus

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and its functions." The officers' accusation that McKee was "exaggerating the threat," and their suggestion that after she "calmed down," she would not want to file a complaint, remind me of the mores of the century preceding even my birth.

In the linguistic history of our society, it is common to find women referred to as hysterical; it is uncommon to find references to hysterical men. Two thousand years of Western Civilization's stereotypes are not easy to undo from the hearts of its people. McKee probably was upset. Such a response is extremely rational and understandable if Streetman had beat her and

threatened her physical safety to the point of death, and the police stood by and did nothing to protect her.⁶ There is nothing "hysterical" about such a response. In contrast, Streetman threatened in the officers' presence to burn her belongings. The officers, who are

⁶ The majority focuses on the fact that McKee asked that the officers either arrest Streetman or take her to her parents' house. Since the officers did not take McKee to her parents' house, the majority's reliance on this point does not further us along the road of understanding. The refusal to transport McKee, like the refusal to arrest, rests upon the same stereotypical notion that police officers should not invade a man's castle.

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
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all male, treated McKee's expressions in a condescending manner, while not responding to Streetman's threat. See *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988) (officer's comment that he "did not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her because of the way she was 'carrying on' " suggests an animus against women).

D. Clearly Established Constitutional Right?

The individual officers are before our Court seeking qualified immunity. "The defense of qualified immunity for government officials represents a compromise between the conflicting concerns of permitting the recovery of damag-

es for vindication of constitutional rights caused by the abuse of public office and permitting government officers to perform discretionary functions without fear of harassing litigation. *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)[.]" *Hynson v. City of Chester*, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (3rd Cir. 1988). "[W]here an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken with independence and without fear of consequences." *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S.



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800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739, 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982). "[T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the law." Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; see also Mel-ear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1989).

I do not believe that a reasonable officer would know that a de facto city custom or policy, and his own actions manifesting the same notions, footed in stereotypes buried deeply in our culture, would violate the Constitution. No published decision in this Circuit sets forth such a theory of

the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supreme Court has not spoken specifically on the subject. Qualified immunity is intended to protect individuals, when sued in their individual capacity, from personal liability when the area of law is evolving. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ("If the law at the time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as

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unlawful"); see Procu-
nier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555, 565, 98 S.-
Ct. 855, 861, 55 L.Ed-
.2d 24 (1978).

On the fundamental
reasons for qualified
immunity is to protect
the individual of-
ficers' discretion
unless that discretion
must be reined in due
to constitutional con-
siderations. Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 102
S.Ct. at 2738 ("gover-
nmental officials per-
forming discretionary
functions generally
are shielded from lia-
bility for civil dama-
ges insofar as their
conduct does not vio-
late clearly es-
tablished...constitut-
ional rights of which
a reasonable person
would have known").
The individual defen-

dants should be gran-
ted summary judgment
on McKee's section
1983 claim. There-
fore, I concur in the
majority's judgment
dismissing the of-
ficers, in their in-
dividual capacities,
with respect to plain-
tiff's section 1983
claim.

II.

PENDENT STATE LAW
CLAIMS

I dissent only from
the majority's dismis-
sal of McKee's pendent
state law claims agai-
nst the individual
defendants. This is-
sue is not before us.
Only a district court-
's denial of an offi-
cial's defense of im-
munity is immediately
appealable as a col-
lateral order under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and Mit-



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chell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct.
2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411
(1985).

The district court should decide in its discretion upon remand whether the pendent state claims should be dismissed. United Mine workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), permits the district court to retain jurisdiction of McKee's pendent state law claims. Several factors would impinge upon the district court's discretion. For example, if the federal claim is not frivolous, the statute of limitations has run, no tolling provision applies, and the case has progressed significantly, the dis-

trict court should retain the case.

III.

CITY OF ROCKWALL'S
APPEAL

I agree with the majority that we lack appellate jurisdiction to hear the City of Rockwall's collateral final appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Although the majority uses the phrase "interlocutory appeal," I note that the officers' immediate appeal is properly before this court as a final, appealable collateral order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Mitchell v. Forsyth, and not as an interlocutory appeal



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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292. To assert an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292, the City would have to receive a certification of interlocutory appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the district court, which the City did not receive in this case. Believing that the majority's opinion is not inconsistent with my stated understanding of appealability, I add my concurrence to this portion of the majority's decision.

CONCLUSION

The social mores of a generation are expressed often in the tribune of constitutional law. As our mores evolve, constitutional law evol-

ves to reflect the beliefs that we now hold to be true and right. The history of race discrimination in this country is the paradigm which illustrates this principle most aptly. The folkways of a society are not the highest ideals of a people. the folkways are, instead, the everyday beliefs and accepted truths that guide our lives. There is a constant effort by all members of our society, conscious and unconscious, to accommodate, in a gradual adjustment, the folkways to the mores.

The law often steps in to catalyze the process of adaptation. We saw this with the tur-



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moil of the desegregation cases. At this point in our history, we are now encountering a parallel adaptation phase involving gender-based discrimination.

It is my firm belief that we are ready to take another step to move the mores forward with the hope that in the end we will obtain a more just society. McKee's case is one step along the path. Recognizing that the folkways still lag a step or so behind the mores in this area, I concur in the majority's result granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment because I believe the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

I await the day when we have moved the mores, and their satellite the folkways, of gender to a higher and more noble plateau.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. _____


THE CITY OF ROCKWALL, TEXAS,
Petitioner,

v.

GAYLA MCKEE,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX B



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

GAYLA McKEE,	§	
	§	
Plaintiff,	§	
	§	
v.	§	CA 3-86-2860-R
	§	
CITY OF ROCKWALL,	§	
TEXAS AND OFFICERS	§	
TREY CHANEY AND GARY	§	
FLEETWOOD OF THE	§	
CITY OF ROCKWALL	§	
POLICE DEPARTMENT,	§	
	§	
Defendants.	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I.

This is a § 1983 case brought by Gayla McKee ("Plaintiff" or "McKee") to redress alleged violations of the equal protection clause manifested by the Defendants' failure to protect her. The Defendants are the City of Rockwall, Texas ("Rockwall"), and Officers Trey Chaney ("Chaney") and Gary Fleetwood ("Fleetwood"). Before this Court are the following motions: (1) Defendants' joint motion to dismiss; (2) Defendants' separate motions for summary judgment; (3)



left, Streetman assaulted Plaintiff again, allegedly causing her serious injury and permanent disfigurement. Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that the officer's conduct reflected a policy or practice of Rockwall's police department of not protecting victims of domestic violence, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

III.

A. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims on two grounds. First, Defendants claim that Plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements applicable in cases involving the qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity shields state officials from liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This

Chaney and Fleetwood's motion for a protective order; (4) Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Defendants' attorney; and (5) Plaintiff's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. For the reasons that follow, this Court will DENY all of the motions.


II.

This case arises out of an assault by Harry Streetman ("Streetman") against Plaintiff, which Defendants failed to prevent. According to Plaintiff's Complaint, she was assaulted by Streetman on April 30, 1986. She called the Rockwall Police to report the assault and Streetman's threats on her life. Defendant Fleetwood and Sgt. Parrish responded to the call, and were later joined by Defendant Chaney. These officers neither arrested Streetman nor took Plaintiff to the police station; Plaintiff alleges that she requested both of these actions. Instead, they took Plaintiff to a friend's house located nearby. Shortly after the police officers



doctrine, which protects state officials from the fear of court supervision of their every action, is circumscribed by a plaintiff's right to "have his day in court." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit has reached a compromise on these conflicting aims by requiring a plaintiff, in a case involving qualified or absolute immunity, to file a "detailed complaint alleging with particularity all material facts on which he contends he will establish his right to recovery, which will include detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained." Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985); Jacquez, supra.¹

¹ Initially, Plaintiff argued that Elliott was not applicable to a case involving qualified--rather than absolute--immunity. However, in her reply, Plaintiff appears to have withdrawn that assertion. Jacquez explicitly held that Elliott's pleading requirements applied in cases involving qualified immunity.



Specifically, Defendants object to three items which they argue were not sufficiently pleaded: (1) Plaintiff's allegations that she and Streetman had a "special relationship" which was known by the officers and which distinguishes her from the public at large; (2) Plaintiff's allegations that the Defendants were informed that "domestic violence" had occurred; and (3) Plaintiff's failure to specifically plead the officers' authority to arrest Streetman.

Defendant's objections to Plaintiff's use of the terms "special relationship" and "domestic violence" were sufficiently detailed under even the most rigorous pleading requirements. It is clear that by referring to her special relationship with Streetman, Plaintiff was merely attempting to indicate that the officers were aware of a potential threat to her which distinguished her from the general public and which created the officer's duty to

protect her. The term "domestic violence" needs no elaboration. Defendants must bear in mind that even under Elliott and Jacquez, the Fifth Circuit does not condemn "artless drafting," Jacquez, supra at 791, and still requires this Court to give Plaintiff's complaint a "sympathetic reading." Id. Only where such a reading uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the Defendants to liability is the pleading deficient.² As to the officers' authority to arrest Streetman, Plaintiff's complaint alleged facts demonstrating that the officers failed to exercise their statutory obligation to

² Even where the complaint fails under Elliott, the district court should, ordinarily, "provide the Plaintiff an opportunity to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements" rather than dismiss the claim. Jacquez, supra at 792. Plaintiff has already proffered an amended complaint in the event her original complaint was found lacking. In light of this Court's decision to deny Defendants' motion to dismiss, however, Plaintiff is under no compulsion to file this amended complaint.

make an arrest when they had probable cause to do so. These allegations gave Defendants sufficient notice of Plaintiff's basis for denying them their qualified immunity.

Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's complaint alleges, at most, a simple claim for negligence which is not actionable under § 1983. In Jacquez, the Fifth Circuit directed the district court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint in which the plaintiff, an inmate at a state prison, alleged that prison officials allowed him to be beaten by fellow inmates. The court concluded that the Plaintiff's only claim was one for negligence:

Here, the plaintiff does not allege that a warning was received, and omits any explanation of how or in what way the Defendants "knew" or "intended" the attack. The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim appears simply to be that the Defendants breached their duty to protect the decedent.

Jacquez, supra at 792. In the present case Plaintiff alleges that she informed Defendants of Streetman's prior attack and

threats. This, coupled with her allegations that Defendants refused to aid her as part of a policy or practice of discriminating against female victims of domestic violence, does state an actionable claim under § 1983. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1944); Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1980). Consequently, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim must be DENIED.

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

1. Rockwall

Rockwall's motion for summary judgment is based on one essential contention--that it has never maintained a policy or practice of refusing to protect victims of domestic violence.³ According to Rockwall, there is

³ Rockwall also argues that such a policy, even if it did exist, did not cause Plaintiff's injuries since no probable cause existed for Streetman's arrest. As discussed infra, however, the existence of probable cause for the arrest involves a disputed question of fact not appropriate for resolution on a summary judgment motion.

nothing in the summary judgment record that controverts this fact.

To establish liability against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation or a persistent, widespread practice of municipal employees, which, although not officially sanctioned, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Ramie v. Hedwig Village, 765 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1985), cert den'd 474 U.S. 1062 (1986); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984), cert den'd 472 U.S. 1016 (1985); and Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983), cert den'd 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).

Rockwall argues that no such policy or practice exists, relying upon the affidavits of Bruce Beaty, Rockwall Chief of Police, Sgt. John Parrish, and Defendant Fleetwood.

Each of these affidavits denies that any discriminatory policy or practice was ever in effect. Instead, each swears that the laws of Texas are uniformly enforced, and arrests made in situations where the officers have probable cause to do so. It is their position that no arrest was made in this case since there was no probable cause to arrest Streetman.

In her response to Defendant's motion, however, Plaintiff attached the affidavit of her mother, Darlene McKee, who swore that during her conversation with Chief of Policy Beaty that:

[W]e asked the Chief why Harry Streetman had not been arrested when our daughter first called the police and reported his assault upon her. The Chief responded that his officers did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial.

Affidavit of Darlene McKee, p.2 (emphasis added). Additionally, Plaintiff compiled statistics, based upon Rockwall's answers to interrogatories, which indicate that



Rockwall police make fewer arrests in cases of domestic assault than in other assaults.

Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., allows summary judgment only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All reasonable doubts and inferences must be decided in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville Railroad Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985). Indeed, so long as there appears to be some evidentiary support for the disputed allegations, the motion must be denied. Coke v. General Adjustments Bureau, 640 F.2d 584, 595 (5th Cir. 1981). While Defendant has submitted affidavits supporting its position that no discriminatory policy or practice exists, Plaintiff has responded with contrary evidence indicating that such a policy or practice was present. Consequently, Rockwall has failed to meet

its summary judgment burden, and its motion must therefore be DENIED.

2. Chaney

Defendant Chaney's motion involves, essentially, one argument--that he cannot be liable under § 1983 since he was off-duty and was not personally involved in the events underlying Plaintiff's claim. According to Chaney, his status as an off-duty police officer "not performing a police function" means that neither the requirements of personal involvement, see e.g., Wilkins v. Whitaker, 714 F.2d 4, 6 (4th Cir. 1983), cert den'd 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); McLaughlin v. La Grange, 662 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1981), cert den'd 456 U.S. 979 (1982), nor of action under color of state law, see e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1970), was met.⁴

⁴ Based upon his status on the day in question, Chaney also asserts that he did not violate any clearly established law since an off-duty officer, uninformed of any threat has no duty to protect an individual. Also, he states that for all of the foregoing reasons, his inaction did not

Supporting his motion, Chaney offered affidavits of himself and Defendant Fleetwood indicating that, although he arrived at the scene, he was off-duty and left after talking briefly to Fleetwood and Sgt. John Parrish. In Plaintiff's affidavit, however, she swears that Chaney was informed of Streetman's prior assault and threats. This alleged knowledge, taken with Chaney's admission of his presence and discussion with Fleetwood and Parrish, raises a genuine issue of material fact of both his participation in the events and his action or inaction under the color of state law. Palmer v. San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 517 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that an off-duty police officer may be liable under § 1983); see also Fireman's & Policemen's

proximately cause Plaintiff's injuries. The proximate cause argument presents no additional legal theories supporting his motion, and will not be dealt with separately. His argument relating to his qualified immunity and breach of clearly established law is discussed--and rejected--with respect to Fleetwood, infra.



Civil Service Commission v. Burnham, 715 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex.Civ.App. - Austin 1986, no writ) ("[A] police officer is on duty twenty four hours a day . . . and [his] off-duty status is not a limitation upon his police authority in the presence of criminal activity."). Therefore, Chaney's motion must also be DENIED.

3. Fleetwood

Defendant Fleetwood's primary contention is that the summary judgment record reveals that he is entitled to qualified immunity since he did not violate any clearly established statutory rights of Plaintiff. According to Fleetwood, he had no arrest warrant for Streetman, no probable cause to arrest Streetman for any crime, and Streetman had not committed any criminal acts within his presence. Based upon these assumptions, Fleetwood contends that his failure to arrest Streetman was not violative of any statutory duty that he owed

Plaintiff, and her injuries were not proximately caused by his misfeasance.

Two problems with Fleetwood's argument are apparent. First, Plaintiff's affidavit disputes Fleetwood's conclusion that he had no probable cause to arrest Streetman. This alone is sufficient grounds to reject his motion. Second, even if Fleetwood is correct in his belief that he had no right to arrest Streetman, that would not relieve him of his obligation to protect Plaintiff from her dangerous circumstances, even though those circumstances might not have given him sufficient grounds for detention of Streetman. The underlying facts of this case are disputed, and it is not possible at this time to determine whether Chaney and Fleetwood's conduct falls under the protective ambit of qualified immunity.⁵

⁵ The parties have not briefed the potential question of whether the officers' duties to -protect citizens from assault and to make arrests--where probable cause exists--constitute "clearly established" obligations. Since both duties originate in



Fleetwood's motion for summary judgment must, therefore, be DENIED.

C. PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants Chaney and Fleetwood also filed a motion for a protective order excusing them from discovery obligations pending this Court's adjudication of their motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. .Since this Memorandum Opinion and Order disposes of their motions for dismissal and for summary judgment, however, their motion no longer has any basis. Therefore, their motion for a protective order is DENIED.

D. DISQUALIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEY

Plaintiff moves this Court to disqualify Defendants' attorney, James Ludlum, from representing all three Defendants due to an alleged potential conflict in their defenses. While Plaintiff

Texas statutes, however, it appears that they would give Plaintiff clearly established statutory rights, such that Defendants' failure to comply with them would vitiate their qualified immunity.



is correct in observing that a potential conflict between individual and governmental defendants in a § 1983 case may be grounds for disqualification of joint representation, see e.g., Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 495 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. den'd 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 85 (E.D.Tex. 1981); Dunton v. Suffolk County, 729 F.2d 903, 907-10 (2d Cir. 1984), Defendants' response and affidavit reveal that any potential for conflict among their defenses has been removed. In her motion, Plaintiff stated that Rockwall would deny the existence of a city policy of ignoring complaints of domestic violence against females, while Chaney and Fleetwood would rely upon such a policy to show their good faith in shielding themselves with qualified immunity. Defendants responded by stating that they all took the position that no policy existed, and in the alternative, that even if there were a policy, there was no



probable cause for Streetman's arrest. Defendants attached a signed affidavit whereby each Defendant declared this to be their common statement of the facts. In light of Defendants' unified factual approach to this lawsuit, no potential conflict remains and Plaintiff's motion for disqualification must be DENIED.

E. MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

Plaintiff's motion for sanctions rests upon her mistaken belief that Elliott does not apply to this case. Since Plaintiff's theory about Elliott is wrong, her motion for sanctions is, therefore, DENIED.

Accordingly, it is the ORDER of this Cour that all of the motions should be, and are hereby DENIED.



SIGNED this 22nd day of October,
1987.

\Jerry Buchmeyer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
JERRY BUCHMEYER